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EXPLAINING INTUITIONS: RELATING MERGERS, CONTRIBUTION, AND
LOSS IN THE ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION
ALICIA BROKARS KELLY*
Follow me where I go what I do and who I know
Make it part of you to be a part of me
Follow me up and down all the way and all around
Take my hand and I will follow you
John Denver

I. INTRODUCTION
Lovers sharing a most intimate moment might well say to one another,
“part of you is part of me.” This expression reflects a common understanding
about the nature of, and our aspirations for, romantic love. As John Denver’s
lyrics recited above suggest, a long-term committed relationship such as marriage is regarded by many as a relationship defined by sharing, interdependence, and care that profoundly affects the identity of individuals who have
1
united their lives. This description reflects the hope and ambition of many couples when they marry—and conduct during marriage often pursues this goal in
2
many ways. When a couple has children, it is even more apparent that the resulting set of enmeshed relationships shapes each participant’s identity on a
daily basis.

Copyright © by Alicia Brokars Kelly.
* Associate Professor of Law, Widener University. This article began while I was teaching at
Western State University College of Law. I am grateful for the insightful comments and advice on
earlier versions of this commentary from my colleagues: Theresa Glennon, Laura Rovner, Michael
Hunter Schwartz, Gregory Sergienko, and Barbara Bennett Woodhouse.
1. Contemporary American culture continues to emphasize the idea of a “companionate marriage” where couples seek intense close relationships with one another, and with children, as part of
their quest for personal happiness. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW
PROPERTY 14-16 (1981). Robert Bellah has made this observation based on conversations with individual Americans about love and marriage:
[Couples] speak of sharing—thoughts, feelings, tasks, values, or life goals—as the greatest
virtue in a relationship. One married woman (previously divorced) explained how she fell
in love: “I think it was the sharing, the real sharing of feelings. . . . I let all my barriers
down. I was really able to be myself with him—very, very comfortable. . . I didn’t . . . have
to worry. . . about what his reaction was going to be. I was just me. I was free to be me.
ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN
LIFE 91 (1985).
2. See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and Property Rhetoric,
82 GEO. L.J. 2303, 2384-87 (1994).
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For spouses who stand at the brink of divorce, reflection upon this paradigm is undoubtedly painful. It is an acute reminder that they face a most difficult struggle—spouses must begin the process of extracting themselves from the
web of connections they have with each other. Milton Regan has poignantly
captured the paradigm of interdependence and the dilemma it creates at divorce:
Ex-spouses are not simply individuals who revert to their former identities as
sovereign individuals. They have shared an experience that has affected them
deeply, to the point where, in a sense, they are not the same persons as they
were when they entered the marriage. . . . [At divorce] they are poised uneasily
at the border: caught in a web of lingering influences from the place they are
leaving, knowing they must begin to shape a new life in the unfamiliar territory
3
they are entering.

This sounds like the stuff of lovers and families and therefore presumably
not of law. But as those in the legal field recognize, the law is no stranger to involvement in family relationships. Dissolution of marriage requires the state to
resolve competing claims to wealth allocation among divorcing spouses and
their children. However, constructing the basis for resolution of these claims has
been a daunting challenge in family law. Legal decisionmakers and those who
seek law reform must grapple with the nature and function of the marital relationship which inevitably plays a crucial role in the formulation of the law of
marriage and its dissolution.
Scholarly literature over the last several decades has been flooded with often thoughtful and provocative explorations of possible theories for wealth allocation upon divorce. There is an on-going, wide-ranging search for a coherent
4
theory on which the law of dissolution might be based. In the meantime, because the field is in chaos (having had no cogent rationale for rules of dissolu-

3. Id. at 2386. Regan describes the divorce transition as perceived by many to be a departure
from the sphere of the family and an re-entry into the sphere of the market. Id. For a description of
the dichotomy between the family and the market and its influential role in shaping legal reforms
see generally Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
4. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND
REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 176-77 (1991); Glendon, supra note 1; ALLEN M. PARKMAN, NO FAULT
DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? (1992); MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE
MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE (1999); Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist
Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 1005-10 (1991); June Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of Community, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 359, 359-60 (1994); Ira
Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference:
A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1987); Joan M. Krauskopf,
Recompense for Financing Spouse’s Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor In Human Capital,
28 U. KAN. L. REV. 379 (1980); Jane Rutherford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58
FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 578 (1990); Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral
Discourse, 1991 BYU L. REV. 197; Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits
of the Economic Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423, 2445-46 (1994); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert
E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1998); Bea Ann Smith, The Partnership
Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEX. L. REV. 689 (1990); Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and
the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing With Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Disassociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67, 85 (1993); Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of
Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227 (1994).
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tion), the nation is burdened with a dizzying patchwork of theory and results.
Adding enormous pressure and urgently needed direction to the search for theory is the current system’s pervasive failure to provide economic justice for
women and the children so often in their care. Women and children bear a disproportionate share of the financial losses triggered by dissolution. These facts
6
are now sadly familiar and have been described at length elsewhere. Any
meaningful law reform effort must work to alleviate these injustices.
It is against this backdrop that the Reporters of the American Law Institute
have taken on the formidable task of formulating a comprehensive set of rules
governing dissolution of marriage and, just as importantly, of providing an explanation of the theory on which the law is based. The ALI’s Principles of the Law
of Family Dissolution recommend dramatic changes to current marital regimes
and holds great promise for more equitable wealth distribution for women and
7
children. One of the most important changes is that, by design, the structure of
8
the rules provides for presumptions of entitlement to wealth. A non-titled
spouse, typically the wife, can now claim an entitlement (a species of property)
to economic resources—she need no longer resort to pleas for help and appeals
to the “charity” of her husband. Importantly, the sections addressing property
division and compensatory payments (a new term for reconceptualized alimony) also clarify and expand the range of claims spouses can successfully assert upon divorce, and thus should result in more generous and predictable fi9
nancial awards to the lower-income spouse (again, usually the wife).
The promise of these reforms, however, critically depends upon the acceptance of the theory underlying the rules for allocation. Unless the theory behind
the Principles is unambiguous and persuasive, the Principles are at risk of rejection by decisionmakers and the advances they offer may be lost. Accordingly,
the focus of this commentary will be an examination of the reasons behind the
rules of wealth allocation between divorcing spouses through property division
and compensatory payments—the areas which have been long in search of a coherent theory. Although partial explanations of the theories that underlie the
rules are offered and have the potential to provide a cogent theory of marriage,
the Principles fail to clearly and convincingly develop a foundation for compensatory payments following intermediate and long-term marriages. The theories
need greater development and exposition, and perhaps even advocacy. This
commentary is an effort to offer some ideas to fill in what the Principles leave
unsaid.

5. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Introduction at 8 (Proposed Final Draft Part I, 1997) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 1997].
6. It is estimated that women and the minor children in their household experience at least a
30 percent decline in their standard of living following divorce. See, e.g., Greg J. Duncan & Saul D.
Hoffman, What are the Economic Consequences of Divorce? 25 DEMOGRAPHY 641 (1988) (cited with approval by Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests on Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE
CROSSROADS 130, 149 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
7. See generally ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 5.
8. See id. Introduction at 9.
9. For example, Ira Ellman, the Chief Reporter for the Principles and the Reporter for Chapter
5, anticipates that the size and reliability of financial awards will increase under the Principles. See Ira
M. Ellman, Inventing Family Law, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 882 (1999).
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And the likely acceptance of the Principles is not all that is at stake. A theory of wealth allocation at dissolution has the potential to shape how we think
about marriage and divorce—to influence what we bring as individuals and
collectively to the institution. The Principles offer a distinct narrative about the
marital relationship, one that parallels the excerpt quoted in the prelude to this
piece. Marriage is understood as an experience defined by sharing that has
long-lasting effects and profoundly shapes the individuals in the relationship. If
this narrative, which has much to offer, is ultimately to become dominant, there
is much work to be done in convincing decisionmakers that it is the appropriate
model regarding the nature of, and our aspirations for, the marital relationship.
II. THE ALI THEORY OF WEALTH ALLOCATION: RELATING MERGERS,
CONTRIBUTION, AND LOSS
The Principles make the sensible connection between property division and
claims for post-divorce income sharing (alimony) by treating aspects of these
10
claims against wealth together as a package. Although the Principles do not ex11
plicitly link the theories for each claim, the sharing theory that underlies the
proposal for presumptive equal division of property is an integral part of the
foundation for awarding compensatory payments to ex-spouses as well. Each
claim will be discussed in turn below.
A. Sharing and Contribution as the Basis for Equal Property Division at Divorce
The Reporters describe the foundation for the presumption of equal division as a rough compromise between two dominant principles in current marital
12
property systems: need and contribution. It is a compromise because “[t]he
equal division rule typically provides [the lower-earning] spouse more than he
13
or she contributed financially, but less than a need-based rule might provide.”
This comment does not explain, however, why contribution should be a determinant factor in property division or why a divorcing spouse should have a responsibility to respond to a former spouse’s economic need.
The answer appears to be in another rationale for equal property division
offered in the Principles: “[t]he equal division rule also follows from the sharing
premise that necessarily underlies the choice of a marital rather than [a title]
14
common-law property system.” Equal division is grounded not on the premise
that spouses make equal financial contributions to the acquisition of assets—because they often do not—but on the supposition that “both spouses contributed

10. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 5, Introduction at 6, 9.
11. The Reporters explain that in most jurisdictions “the policy basis for awarding alimony is
largely indistinguishable from the basis for allowing one spouse an enhanced share of the marital
property. Under existing law, “need” is the most common rationale for both.” Id. Introduction at 9
(emphasis added). The unifying theme offered by the Principles is whether a spouse has incurred a
compensable loss. Id. As discussed below, this theme refers not only to the basis for awarding an
enhanced share of property but to a unified theory for sharing property to begin with, and for sharing income.
12. See id. § 4.15 cmt. b.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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significantly to the entire relationship, whether or not they contributed [directly]
15
to accumulation of property during it.” This factual premise of reciprocal
spousal contributions reflects an assumption about the way the marital relationship functions—it is a relationship defined by sharing that does not lend itself to
a financial accounting. The Reporters find support for this assumption in the
fact that spouses who have an option for unilateral divorce (as every jurisdiction
now provides) nonetheless stayed together for the duration of their marriage
and so, “we may assume that both derive benefit from the marriage while it
continues, and that therefore both have claims on the surplus value remaining at
16
its end.” To attempt to retrospectively measure relative spousal contributions
over the life of marriage, the Reporters rightly conclude, “would be impractical
17
if not impossible.”
Beyond this, the Principles defer the question of whether one ex-spouse
should have an obligation to respond to the other ex-spouse’s economic need to
18
the discussion of compensatory payments set forth in Chapter 5. However, if
there is an economic loss for which a spouse is entitled compensation under
Chapter 5, recompense may be provided through an offsetting award of property if the circumstances make a lump-sum property award more appropriate
19
than a longer term payment plan. The “property offset” is just a choice of payment method and nothing more. The determination as to whether a spouse is
entitled to a compensatory payment is separate from a spouse’s basic entitlement to share in accumulated marital property. Accordingly, the core rationale
for equal sharing of marital property appears to be a contribution principle—but
rather than defining contribution to narrowly refer only to financial additions,
the Principles recognize equal contribution to the marital relationship as a
20
whole. As the basis for property division at divorce then, the Principles openly
adopt a view of marriage defined by pervasive sharing where both spouses provide valuable and widely variable resources to the marriage.
B. Contribution and Merger as the Basis for Compensatory Payments between
Spouses
It is often the case that upon divorce a lower- (or no-) earning spouse is urgently in need of economic support. Yet it is not clear why, in a unilateral nofault system of divorce, the former spouse should be responsible to respond to
such a need. Through the availability of alimony, current divorce law (in theory) reflects the intuition that, after a long-term marriage, a higher-earning
spouse may have some ongoing responsibility for the financial situation of the

15. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 5, § 4.15 cmt. c.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See id. § 4.15 cmt. d.
19. See id. § 5.11(2)(c).
20. Another section of the property division chapter builds upon this principle: section 4.18 recharacterizes separate property as marital property over time in long-term marriages. See id. § 4.18.
The rationale for this more extensive sharing is the same as that for compensatory payments discussed below. See ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 5, § 4.18 cmt. a.
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lower-earning spouse. The challenge, accepted in the Principles, is to unpack the
basis for that intuition.
1. Economic Conduct as a Basis for Ongoing Financial Obligations
Following Divorce
In some fact patterns analyzed in the Principles, particularly given the mod21
ern inclination to link economic theory and family interactions, it is fairly easy
to explain the basis for recognizing one spouse’s entitlement to share in the
higher-earning spouse’s income for a period of time following divorce. A particularly important and recurring fact pattern of this kind is the situation where
one spouse (usually the wife) limits or forgoes development of a career in the
labor market and instead dedicates her efforts to providing primary care for
children, while the other spouse (usually the husband) provides income from
market employment. The parties’ joint economic and non-economic choices are
evident and were made for the purpose of benefiting the interests of the entire
family as a unit. However, at divorce, unless there is reallocation of the family
wage from market labor, only one spouse—the home-focused spouse—will bear
the serious economic losses that flow from these joint decisions. As the Reporters explain, “[t]his result is inappropriate because the cost of raising the couple’s
22
children is their joint responsibility.” Additionally, this kind of result is comfortingly familiar in contract law—the wife has relied, to her economic detriment, on an implicit promise of continued access to the family wage. Accordingly, the Principles provide a claim of entitlement to compensation for lost
23
earning capacity (presumptively) experienced by a primary caretaker.
The Principles also provide a claim in some circumstances for compensation
for one spouse’s financial contributions to the other spouse’s education or
24
training. The basis for this compensation scheme should also be relatively noncontroversial. Like compensation for lost earning capacity by a primary caretaker, where a spouse receives economic support to pursue career enhancements, the couple has engaged in clear economic conduct and choices based on
the expectation of a shared financial future. Therefore, a spouse who provides
funds for tuition or other direct costs of the other spouse’s education or training,
or who provides the principal economic support of the family while the career
enhancement is acquired, is entitled to reimbursement for such contributions, as
25
long as the enhancement occurred relatively close to the time of the divorce.
Although the Principles do not categorize these compensation schemes in this
way, the situations described in this section are quite clearly responsive to the
parties’ implied joint economic decisionmaking and conduct.

21. See, e.g., Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of Economics, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 989 (1995).
22. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 5, § 5.06 cmt. a.
23. Id. § 5.06
24. See id. § 5.15.
25. See id. To make a successful claim for reimbursement the claimant must also demonstrate
that there was in fact a “substantial” enhancement to a career. Id.
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2. Beyond Economic Conduct
A theory of wealth allocation based on evident financial exchanges between spouses such as those just described is likely to be persuasive in modern
times based on its connection to readily-accepted market principles. However,
the farther divorce wealth allocation theory moves away from fact patterns that
demonstrate fairly clear and discrete economic exchanges, the more difficult the
case has been for justifying an obligation for spousal compensation following
divorce. In Section 5.05, the Principles provide for compensation for loss of the
26
marital standard of living, after a marriage of sufficiently long duration. This
entitlement scheme implicitly reflects a theory about the meaning and function
of the marital relationship that, at times, extends well beyond the spouses’ economic conduct. In fact, the Reporters explicitly reject economic exchange as the
basis for this kind of compensatory spousal payment: “exchange terms seem inapt because the parties define their relation by its non-financial aspects even
27
though financial sharing is an important part of it.” If this scheme is to be accepted by legal decisionmakers (who likely have a strong economic orientation),
a compelling case for its rationale must be made. However, in crucial ways, the
Principles fail to clearly and convincingly develop a foundation for income
sharing in the absence of evident economic conduct. The comments following
Section 5.05 do provide partial explanations that have the potential to provide a
cogent theory of marriage. The discussion below offers some ideas to fill in what
the Principles leave unsaid.
Section 5.05 recognizes that following divorce a lower-earning spouse loses
the expectation of the standard of living that was sustained by the higherearning spouse’s income. Although the economically inferior spouse may often
seem “in need” of assistance, the Reporters abandon the current law’s prevalent
28
explanation of need as the basis for alimony. The concept of need, the authors
explain, is flawed in two respects: 1) simply observing that a former spouse is in
need does not explain why an ex-spouse should be responsible to meet that
need rather than the needy spouse’s family, friends, or society; and 2) how do
29
we define need? “Need” could be limited to the basic necessities of life, or it
could mean that a spouse is unable to maintain the standard of living attained
during the marriage. Rather than basing alimony claims on the unsatisfying
theory of need, the Principles reformulate the concept as compensation for losses
30
that are disproportionately and unfairly borne by one spouse at dissolution.
But what leads the Reporters to conclude that a loss has fallen “unfairly” on
one spouse such that reallocation of loss is appropriate? One possible set of explanations is that of economic theory which animates the Principles’ compensation structure for primary caretaker earning capacity losses and for reimbursement for financial contributions to career enhancements. However, the
Reporters’ sense, reflected in Section 5.05, that a significant disparity in former
spouses’ financial prospects is unjust is not based primarily on economics. The

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See id. § 5.05.
ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 5, § 5.05 cmt. b.
Id. § 5.02 cmt. a.
See id. Introduction at 8-9.
See id.
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Reporters offer theories of “differential risk” and “the principle of gradually
merging responsibility” as the rationales for entitlement to income sharing after
marriages of sufficient duration. Although the rationales are at times quite
vague, having been only partially explicated, it can be inferred that it is the nature of non-economic conduct that occurs in (long-term) marriages, presumably
in addition to economic conduct, that justifies income sharing for a period of
time after divorce.
a) Differential Risk
In part, the Reporters attribute some courts’ willingness to award alimony
to a homemaker spouse in a long marriage to a perception that the homemaker
faces a greater financial risk from the dissolution than does the “breadwinner”
31
spouse. Although the homemaker is the “classic” example, the risk differential
32
applies to any economically dependent spouse. At divorce, if the lower- or noearning spouse loses access to the income of the higher-earning spouse, she will
experience a severe financial loss whereas the higher-earning spouse will expe33
rience no loss, or one of much lesser magnitude, or perhaps even a gain. The
Principles take the position that, when the marriage exceeds a minimum duration, there should ordinarily be reallocation of this disparate loss of the marital
34
standard of living. The reallocation of loss is proportional to the length of the
marriage in part because a wife’s sense of financial loss itself increases with
marital duration—her “economic dependence grows as the gap widens between
35
the marital living standard and the wife’s own earning prospects.” The longer
the marriage, the greater the risk of loss differential. Restoration of undeveloped earning potential becomes more difficult as the wife grows older, whereas
the husband is likely to have increased his earning capacity over a long marriage. Also, the wife’s prospects for remarriage decline with time, while the
husband’s own remarriage prospects likely will not decrease to the same ex36
tent.
This reasoning acknowledges that wives facing divorce are often financially
vulnerable relative to their husbands, and recognizes a husband’s obligation to
mitigate this risk. Of course, simply observing this risk does not explain the basis for its reallocation. One explanation provided by the authors is that reallocating differential risk may reduce the probability of an economically superior
37
spouse exploiting the economically inferior spouse within marriage. The theory is that, to the extent that marital law provides for greater financial equality
between spouses following dissolution of marriage, spouses will likely possess
more equal bargaining power in the marriage and have equalized economic in38
centives for the success or failure of the marriage.
31. See id. § 5.05 cmt. c.
32. Id.
33. See Sugarman, supra note 6, and accompanying text.
34. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 5, § 5.05 cmt. c.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 158 (1989)(explaining that
economic inequalities between spouses often lead to inequalities in power).
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However, there is another, more central, explanation embodied in the Principles for reallocation of the marital living standard loss. The Principles imply
that the independent spouse has contributed to, or has accepted responsibility
for, the vulnerability the dependent spouse faces at divorce.
b) The Principle of Gradually Merging Responsibility
The core explanation given in the Principles for compensation for loss of the
marital standard of living (after long marriages) is that the way the marital relationship operates justifies recognition of financial obligations that survive for a
period of time following divorce.
The obligation recognized by this section . . . does not arise from the marriage
ceremony alone, but takes longer to develop. As a marriage lengthens the parties assume roles and functions with respect to one another. When adults share
enough of their life together they may mold one another as surely as parents affect their child. Eventually the molds harden. The nature and speed of the process must vary with the couple, but at its limits seems nearly inevitable. Few
would urge a different analysis in the usual marriage of 35 years. The obligation. . . thus assumes no blameworthiness for the marital failure, just as the obligation to support one’s child assumes no blameworthiness for the child’s conception. It is enough to recognize that the parties’ situation at the end of their
marriage is the consequence of both their acts to conclude that it is their joint re39
sponsibility.

The Reporters identify this theory as “the principle of gradually merging
40
responsibility.” The theory is very broad-based and includes several important
dimensions for examination. In fact, the theory appears to be a conglomeration
41
of various theories of marriage. The focus here will be on three facets of the
“merger” principle. First, the theory posits that joint conduct has created the financial situation spouses find themselves in at divorce. Although the Principles
42
suggest that contribution is too problematic to be maintained as a justification,
their “joint causation” thesis can be characterized as an expansive joint contribution rationale; together, spouses contribute to both the gains and losses in a
43
marriage and so should share them jointly at divorce. Second, the authors
seem to accept, in some situations, a recognition of responsibility for a spouse’s
financial situation even if no causal connection between conduct in the marriage
and the parties’ relative financial positions at divorce can be established. Finally, when combined with the theory of joint contribution—which is reflected
39. See ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 5, § 5.05 cmt. c.
40. See id.
41. This may well be an effective way to develop a coherent theory. The challenge of developing a single cohesive theory has proved most difficult because our intuitions so often change depending on the fact pattern of marital conduct that is being considered. As soon as there is a theory
that explains why the result in a particular fact pattern given seems appropriate, the suggestion of a
variant of facts often makes the previous explanation seem inadequate. So, the search for a unifying
theory has raged on with little resolution.
42. See ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 5, § 5.05 cmt. b.
43. This also corresponds closely with a marital (rather than business) partnership theory as
suggested by Milton Regan. See Regan, supra note 2, at 2371-73. The Reporters acknowledge the parallels of the merger principles to both Regan’s partnership theory as well as Stephen Sugarman’s
theory of merger over time. See Sugarman, supra note 6, at 149.
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in the rationale justifying an equal property distribution at divorce—the Principles plainly espouse a particular model of marriage. Rather than depicting marriage as a largely individualistic endeavor, the relationship is portrayed as one
defined by norms of interdependence, altruism, and sharing.
i) Joint Conduct, Joint Outcomes
For many, long-term relationships evoke an intuition that the relationship
generates an obligation for at least rough equality in the parties’ situations when
the relationship ends. A crucial part of the explanation for this perception stems
from common conceptions about how spouses behave in a long marriage. In
important respects, many people perceive that individual conduct before marriage is dramatically transformed once marriage occurs and progresses. The decisionmaking process changes within marriage: it is no longer a simple question
of whether a contemplated choice will be good (or bad) for the individual, but
instead whether a decision will result in a benefit (or harm) for the two of them
together. In marriage, spouses typically engage in a myriad of exchanges—economical and psychological—sharing labor (in and out of the market) and leisure.
This collaborative conduct reflects the view that the resources each family member has access to are available to serve the needs of the entire family regardless
of each member’s individual contribution to the resource.
The Principles seem to have this image of marital conduct in mind in formulating the conclusion that “[i]t is enough to recognize that the parties’ situation at the end of their marriage is the consequence of both their acts to conclude
44
that it is their joint responsibility.” From this perspective, the principle of joint
contribution to the financial outcome each spouse faces at divorce is almost indistinguishable from the Reporters’ rationale for equal sharing of property at
divorce. Recall that the equal property division the Reporters advocate is based
on the premise that “both spouses contributed significantly to the entire relationship, whether or not they contributed [directly] to accumulation of property
45
during it.” The core concept is the same for compensatory spousal payments
following a long marriage—sharing in marriage leads to sharing its consequences at divorce.
Many or perhaps most people would likely agree that spouses engage in
joint conduct of the kind assumed in the Principles. However, if cooperative behavior is a major factual premise underlying wealth reallocation upon divorce,
then a logical reaction is that the factual assumption should be rebuttable by
evidence that the parties in a particular marriage did not conform to this model
of behavior. In this way, the “joint causation” rationale behind compensatory
spousal payments shares the same difficulties the current contribution rationale
46
labors under.
Although the Reporters assert that they are rejecting the notion of contri47
bution as the basis for compensatory spousal payments, it appears that their
rejection is not of the contribution principle itself, but rather is of the more nar-

44.
45.
46.
47.

ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 5, § 5.05 cmt. c.
Id. § 4.15 cmt. c.
Id. §§ 4.15 cmt. c, 5.05 cmt. b.
Id.
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row conception of contribution evident in modern marital law. The authors explain that the modern contribution principle is flawed as a factual basis for
greater wealth reallocation at divorce because it often focuses on each spouse’s
financial contribution to the acquisition of economic resources during mar48
riage. This approach is problematic because, while in many cases it may be
true that both spouses make financial contributions, such contributions are
rarely equal and can be difficult to prove. In fact, it is frequently the case that
one spouse makes little or no direct economic contribution to marital wealth.
Additionally, the trend in practice suggests that claims for property distri49
bution are rarely defeated by a showing of unequal financial contribution. Accordingly, the Reporters conclude that in the context of property division, “[i]t
makes far more sense to ground an equal division presumption on the spouse’s
contribution to the entire marital relationship, not just to the accumulation of fi50
nancial assets.” Furthermore, because of the difficulty of measurement (which
would require a retrospective accounting of spousal conduct over the length of
the marriage), the Reporters conclude that it is sensible to make an irrebuttable
presumption of equal contribution to the relationship. However, in the context
of compensatory spousal payments, the problem of a potential factual rebuttal is
addressed only hazily and ultimately is left to vagaries of judicial discretion.
The presumption of entitlement under Section 5.05 suggests that the factual
premise of joint conduct causing joint outcomes is assumed, requiring no specific showing that, in fact, such conduct occurred during marriage. If this factual
assumption is tested against a fairly common fact pattern, it appears comfortably accurate. Imagine a married couple with no children who decide that the
wife should become a full-time homemaker. The wife, having been employed in
the early years of marriage as an insurance claims representative, leaves her
employment and works only in the home, without compensation, for 15 years. If
she re-enters the paid labor market at divorce, assume she might make roughly
$30,000 annually whereas her engineer husband, having increased his earnings
over the course of the marriage, might make roughly $85,000 a year.
Here, the Principles’ theory of joint causation for each spouse’s economic
circumstance at divorce appears to be accurate. The wife’s earning capacity loss
was in fact caused by a joint decision that the wife abandon her insurance career
and forgo development of the earning capacity that career would bring. Focusing on the husband’s situation at divorce, however, it is less clear that joint acts
caused his economic circumstance—arguably, he would he have been an engineer making $85,000 annually regardless of the marriage. But assume now that
he worked long hours to advance his career with her taking up the slack in their
personal lives, and that she directly supported his career by moving to several
geographic locations for his career advancement and also entertained his clients
and co-workers extensively. With these additional facts, his situation at divorce
easily fits the joint causation model. Compensation for the wife’s loss of the
marital standard of living under these facts is particularly appealing. Like the
earlier discussed examples of the primary caretaker spouse—and the supporting

48.
49.
50.

Id.
See id. § 5.05 cmt. b.
ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 5, § 4.15 cmt. c.
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spouse who contributed to the other spouse’s education—the economic exchanges between the parties are evident.
However, as the facts depart from one spouse making clear and direct contributions to the other’s economic success, it becomes more difficult to support a
theory of joint causation. Another fairly common factual scenario that contradicts the joint contribution premise can easily be imagined. Assuming the initial
facts described are the same, consider a variation on the factual scenario: instead
of the wife becoming a homemaker during the parties’ marriage, she remains in
her position as an insurance representative. The parties did not move to advance the husband’s career and the wife did not entertain clients and co-workers
extensively. At divorce, after modest promotions, the wife earns $45,000 in the
insurance field, and the husband earns $85,000 from engineering. This fact pattern arguably does not conform to the joint causation model. It might reasonably be suggested that the spouses would be in exactly the same disparate financial circumstances whether they were married or not.
ii) Constructing the Possible Meanings of “Merger over Time”
What should the result be if joint causation does not unambiguously justify
reallocation of income? The Principles do not provide any guidance on this point.
Two alternative interpretations of “the principle of gradually merging responsibility” can be constructed. Both support the view that the nature of marriage itself justifies an entitlement to income sharing for a period of time after divorce,
notwithstanding the lack of evidence of joint conduct causing the spouses’ relative financial outcomes.
The Reporters prominently depict marriage as a relationship of mutual
contribution that profoundly shapes each individual spouse’s identity: “[w]hen
adults share enough of their life together they may mold one another as surely
as parents affect their child. Eventually the molds harden. . . . [A]t its limits [the
51
process] seems nearly inevitable.” This description suggests that the conclusion in the last factual scenario, that the wife (insurance representative) and
husband (engineer) would be in the same positions regardless of marriage, cannot be supported. We simply cannot know whether the husband would be in
the same situation without his wife’s participation in his life, just as we cannot
know who she might have been absent their marriage. Rather than engaging in
a guessing game of “what ifs”, it makes sense to rely on a common understanding about the way the marital relationship functions. Thus, it is fair to characterize his situation as well as hers, as flowing from their marriage—assuming
that in most marriages a significant part of spousal behavior reflects reciprocal
sharing and interdependence, and that each spouse’s identity is powerfully
shaped as a result. Spouses are who they are at the end of marriage at least in
important part because of their having lived united lives within the marriage.
Proving otherwise may well be impossible. The Principles broad presumption of
entitlement seemingly advocates that this depiction of the nature of marriage be
accepted as “the usual case.”
This understanding may be what the Reporters meant by the principle of
merger as the basis for income sharing after long unions, a concept they describe
51.

Id.
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52

as similar to scholar Stephen Sugarman’s theory of merger over time. His theory is that the longer spouses are married, the more their human capital is intertwined: “[a]fter a while, one can less and less distinguish between what was
53
brought into the marriage and what was produced by it.”
However, even when faced with a lack of causal connection between marital conduct and divorce outcomes, an inclination for entitlement to income
sharing following divorce may go well beyond recognition of the difficulties of
factual proof of causation. At some level, regardless of whether a particular
marriage in fact causes spousal economic circumstances at divorce or not, many
intuit that that there ought to be joint responsibility for economic losses triggered by divorce. Another interpretation of “gradually merging responsibility,”
distinct from the first, flows from this possibility. Perhaps what happens in
marriage is that spouses over time integrate many aspects of themselves into a
cohesive “marital unit.” This occurs where each spouse brings his or her individual strengths and weaknesses together and merges them to such an extent
that each can be held responsible for whatever situation the other faces at divorce. Certainly, this kind of merger of economic and non-economic strengths
and weaknesses occurs within many intact marriages. For example, married
couples regularly pool their incomes, for good or bad, such that an economi54
cally-inferior spouse regularly shares the income of a higher-earning spouse.
The Principles provide that responsibility for this kind of marital merger should
survive for a period of time following divorce.
One rationale for recognizing responsibility for spousal outcomes, arguably
not caused by marital conduct, might be that spouses have impliedly consented
to accept such responsibility as demonstrated by their “merger behavior” during
marriage. This explanation is perhaps an elaborate extension of familiar liberal
social contract theory: voluntary “acceptance” of responsibility is evidenced by a
relationship of long-term sharing and interdependence. Both parties freely
merged their lives and thus implicitly agreed to ongoing financial obligations
55
during the period of time it will take to untangle the merger.
However, the Reporters’ theory of merger and responsibility may be read
to encompass principles considered more radical than this: post-divorce obligation should be recognized even if the parties cannot really be deemed to have
consented to it. In addition to Stephen Sugarman’s theory of marital merger, the
Reporters rely on principles from family law scholar Milton Regan’s theoretical
52.
53.
54.

Id. § 5.05 cmt. c, reporter’s note at 304.
Sugarman, supra note 6, at 159-60.
Deborah Rhode and Martha Minow explain this point:

In an ongoing marriage, the entire family shares in the salary advantages . . . and benefits
that disproportionately accompany male jobs. A wife is thus somewhat shielded from the
full force of her disadvantages in a wage economy; she contributes her lower wages and
uncompensated domestic labor to enhance the family’s well-being without having to sustain herself and her children on that inadequate economic base.
See Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms: Feminist
Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 191, 193 (Stephen D. Sugarman
& Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990) (footnote omitted).
55. For a cogent description of social contract theory, and particularly its connection to feminist
theory, see Regan, supra note 2, at 2344-49 (discussing in detail NANCY J. HIRSCHMANN, RETHINKING
OBLIGATION: FEMINIST METHODS FOR POLITICAL THEORY (1992)).
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work concerning marriage. Recognizing marriage as a complex and special
relationship that includes a host of economic sacrifices and plans as well as an
“ethic of care” that goes beyond financial concerns, Regan explicitly argues for
recognition of a community between ex-spouses that survives divorce for some
time:
The interdependence and vulnerability that marriage often creates can give rise
to responsibility that is not adequately conceptualized as voluntarily assumed.
Those in the realm of the family sometimes recognize, as well as consent to, obligation. Sharing one’s life with another can create a special duty of care to ensure that one’s partner is not seriously disadvantaged by the end of a relationship that so profoundly shapes a person’s sense of identity and meaning. In this
sense, the prior marriage itself can be a source of obligation, regardless of the
57
discrete exchanges that occurred within it.

In many instances, the obligation does not flow from consent, but exists because the special nature of marriage demands it. The Reporters’ explanations of
the principle of gradually merging responsibility reflect crucial aspects of this
thesis. Perhaps the authors meant to incorporate these principles by referring to
the “roles and functions” parties assume with one another, and by making the
analogy that the spousal relationship of interdependence which significantly
molds each spouse parallels the influence and corresponding obligation parents
58
have to their children. Furthermore, the Reporters’ comments do not require
proof of economic sacrifice or other marital “causation” for spousal income disparity: “[i]t is the income disparity itself, and not the reason for the disparity,
59
that over time gradually enlarges her financial stake in the marriage. . .”
iii) Advocating a Community Model of Marriage
As the foregoing discussion highlights at several points, the Principles’ cumulative basis for post-divorce financial obligations vividly portrays a model of
marriage defined by pervasive commitment, interdependence, and sharing that
rejects a strict cost-benefit accounting. This model subscribes to values often associated with community ideology, emphasizing the importance of connections
60
among humans as a defining component of human identity. The model deemphasizes the principles of individual autonomy prevalent in the American
61
tradition of individualism. These two opposing models are admittedly stylized, as the complexities of human behavior cannot adequately be captured by
two extreme depictions such as these. However, this framework can prove use-

56. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 5, § 5.05 cmt. c.
57. Regan, supra note 2, at 2349.
58. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 5, § 5.05 cmt. c.
59. Id.
60. When I refer to “community” norms in this piece I mean to refer quite simply to the notion I
describe here—that interdependence and connections in human relationships is an important part of
human identity that deserves emphasis, although certainly not emphasis that excludes other values.
61. See generally Elizabeth Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L.
REV. 687 (providing an informative description of the basic components of liberal theory, communitarian theory and the liberal-communitarian debate).
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ful in illuminating prevalent tensions in our thinking about marriage. The
competing views of atomistic individualism, defined by freedom from others,
and community, defined by interdependence and connection to others, have
63
been thoughtfully explored in the context of marriage elsewhere. I raise the issue here simply to highlight that the Principles have now taken a strong position
in this debate, recommending the policy choice that sharing principles and
community norms be the prime values in the law of marriage and its dissolution.
Like many in the legal community and beyond who advocate a conception
64
of marriage that is more inclusive of community values, I believe this emphasis
is the right one and has much to recommend it. This issue deserves fuller treatment than can be offered here, but it is worth highlighting two core rationales
that recommend marital law’s commitment to community norms. Perhaps the
most convincing reason for embracing community norms in marriage is because
many couples themselves have chosen the principles of interdependence and
sharing as crucial components of their aspirations for, and behavior in, mar65
riage. One study suggests, for example, that most couples entering marriage
see the relationship as an open-ended commitment to a shared life that will en66
dure. Most people would probably agree that marital behavior typically includes conduct described by the Reporters as the basis for compensatory
spousal payments—a relationship reflecting mutual sharing and a host of exchanges and accommodations in which spouses forge essential constituents of
their identities.
In addition to reflecting commonly held views of and behavior in marriage,
the model of marriage chosen by law may have some influence in how members
of society conceptualize the meaning of marriage. Regan’s observation is apt:
“Enforcing obligations that endure beyond marriage helps constitute this relationship as a special community, signaling that it involves a special commitment
67
to the welfare of another.”
It may be that an assumption that the law can shape human behavior is unrealistic given the complexities and varying sources that animate individual
conduct. Nonetheless, as Katharine Bartlett suggests:
Marriage in this society is still an important ideal. Marriage rates remain high
and most unmarried adults want, or expect, to marry. . . . The appeal of marriage makes it an important resource for transmitting and reinforcing the values
of commitment and responsibility thought to be important to families and chil68
dren.

62. See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr., Boundaries of Care: Constructing Community After Divorce, 31
HOUS. L. REV. 425, 430 (1994).
63. See generally Regan, supra note 62; Scott, supra note 61.
64. See Regan, supra note 62.
65. See generally BELLAH et al., supra note 1.
66. See Lynn Baker & Robert Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and
Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 444 (1993).
67. Regan, supra note 62, at 440.
68. Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family From the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 809, 815-16
(1998).
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However gentle the nudge might be, “direction . . . is still important, even on a
69
small scale, and incremental changes may produce cumulative effects.”
iv) Risk of Rejection of the Community Model of Marriage
Unfortunately, the Reporters do not make the case for why a community
orientation is the one that should be embraced, nor do they clarify the degree of
commitment to this model embodied in the Principles. In ignoring the need for
clarity and persuasion to convince decisionmakers to accept this view, the Reporters may well underestimate the powerful influence that individualism has
in shaping our conceptions about relationship—even in the community paradigm of marriage. This omission seriously decreases the likelihood that the reforms advocated in the Principles will ever be adopted.
Important aspects of modern divorce outcomes already reveal a strong individualistic orientation and, thus, a community framework is at a severe disadvantage. For instance, focusing on entitlement to post-divorce income sharing
(an issue for which the Principles advocate dramatic and inevitably controversial
changes) the law’s current treatment of such claims demonstrates widespread
70
reluctance to redistribute “the man’s income.” As I have suggested at length
elsewhere, this tendency is evidenced quite clearly in enhanced earning capacity
71
cases. In situations where one spouse (the husband) earns a professional degree with the support of the other spouse (the wife), courts regularly conclude
that income and enhancements to income are individually, rather than collectively, earned and are owned by the spouse who has nominal title to the degree.
This conclusion is manifest in the typical results in these kinds of cases, where,
despite frequent assertions to the contrary and facts that demonstrate pervasive
sharing and contribution by both parties, wives are left with no successful claim
to reallocation of wealth based on their participation in the acquisition of the
72
wealth enhancement or in the marriage more generally.
The lessons of the modern law’s resistance to meaningful recognition of
women’s entitlement to post-divorce income sharing suggest that to be successful on this front, any reform effort must minimize opportunities for denying a
claim to such entitlement. However, the Principles do not accomplish this objective. Although the core theories behind the Principles’ wealth reallocation
schemes concerning property and income distribution embrace community
norms in marriage, the structure of the rules themselves provides plentiful opportunities for decisionmakers to infuse their judgments with the tenets of individualism. Ultimately, the effect is that the door has been opened to deny
claims of entitlement to income sharing and, accordingly, the law’s commitment
to community ideology is at risk of rejection on a case by case basis, even if the
Principles and their underlying theory are accepted.
On one hand, Section 5.05(1) recommends a presumptive entitlement to
compensatory spousal payments in long-term marriages. The nature and op-

69. Regan, supra, note 62, at 449.
70. See Williams, supra note 4, at 2234.
71. See generally Alicia Brokars Kelly, The Marital Partnership Pretense and Career Assets: The Ascendancy of Self Over the Marital Community, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 59 (2001).
72. See id. at 103-07.
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eration of the marital relationship itself, whether it is based on an assumption of
joint contribution or on the perhaps distinct concept of “merger over time,” is
the central basis for entitlement. No specific evidence of the way a particular
marriage in fact operated is needed—its function is presumed. On the other
hand, under Section 5.05(4), the presumption of entitlement is rebuttable by
facts, set forth in written findings, that establish that the presumption’s applica73
tion in a particular case “would yield a substantial injustice.” Only one illustration is provided in the Principles to illuminate when a departure from the entitlement presumption might be warranted. The example given is that of a
couple who are married for twelve years, easily satisfying the minimum duration (six years) required by a hypothetical state statute to trigger the presump74
tion, and, who have at least a 25 percent disparity in their incomes at divorce.
However, the couple lived separate and apart after only two years of marriage
75
and, in the intervening years, did not pool income or expenses. The authors do
not offer an explanation as to why this example justifies deviation from the presumption. It can only be assumed that the conduct within this hypothetical
couple’s marriage is not perceived to conform to the joint contribution or merger
premises.
The example given is extreme because the hypothetical couple really did
not share their lives except for the first two years of marriage. Presumably, this
factual scenario is rare. Nonetheless, the illustration demonstrates that under
the Principles, the joint contribution and merger norms attributed to a typical
marriage are open to factual dispute. No guidance is given on how to resolve
the much more difficult situation I described earlier, where the engineer husband and the insurance representative wife would arguably have been in the
same disparate economic circumstances regardless of the marriage. Taking the
rebuttable presumption to its logical extension with these facts, a court might
justify deviation from the presumption based on the conclusion that “joint acts”
during marriage did not cause the parties’ financial circumstances at divorce—
life did.
Such a reading reasonably flows from the generalized theory offered by the
Reporters, particularly because the notion of joint causation is the clearest aspect
of the authors’ articulation of the principle of gradually merging responsibility.
This is probably not the result that the Reporters intended. It appears that the
Reporters anticipate that, in the usual case, the presumption will not be overcome because the factual premises underlying the compensatory scheme will be
present in the vast majority of cases. Section 5.05 comment a explains: “significant marital duration and income disparity are ordinarily adequate of them76
selves to justify the award.” Since the presumption is raised only once the
thresholds of marital duration and income disparity have been met, it is not
clear what facts justify deviation from the presumption. The Reporters’ prediction that the presumptions will serve to make the law governing compensatory
payments “consistent and predictable in application” may prove to be inaccu-

73.
74.
75.
76.

ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 5, § 5.05(4).
Id. § 5.05 cmt. e, illus. 2.
Id.
Id. § 5.05 cmt. a.
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rate. In the rules’ current formulation, entitlement to income sharing based on
long-term marriages is made vulnerable to the potential vagaries of judicial discretion on a case-by-case basis.
At a minimum, the Principles urgently need a wider array of specific illustrations that provide courts with a greater understanding of the theory behind
income sharing following divorce and, most importantly, of the circumstances
that justify deviation from the law’s commitment to the primacy of community
in marriage. Moreover, a detailed exposition of the theory and the sharing
principles that shape the proposed law would also provide the necessary clarity
for understanding the rules and convincing decisionmakers to adopt them. Finally, as they have done with property division, the Principles could make the
presumption of entitlement subject to only a very few specifically defined exceptions, thus largely foreclosing the possibility of discretionary and variable
policy judgments by individual judges. In these ways, the promise of the positive and much needed reforms offered by the Principles may come closer to realization.
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